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INTRODUCTION
The Netherlands is one of the donor-countnes that has shown a
strong commitment to democratization efforts and to partici-
pation m électoral observation missions in Africa. This chapter
is a reflection on discussions held between observers, académies
and policy-makers at thé Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in February 1997 during a seminar organized by the
Ministry and the African Studies Centre, Leiden. As thé
séminal brought together thé three main parties in thé élec-
toral observation effort and debated on thé core issues involved,
a summary of thé discussions is presented hère which in ils turn
is useful to introducé the two subséquent chapters on thé devel-
opment of pohcy and practice.
Assessing thé potential and impact of élection observation on
democratization processes in Africa must be based on a contin-
uous dialogue and exchange of views between host govern-
ments, countries sending observers, actors on thé local political
scène of the country holding élections, and domestic and
foreign observers themselves. This chapter is an attempt to
contnbute to such dialogue and is based on discussions and
conversations with field observers (active in récent years in
African élections), policy-makers and researchers (see also Von
Meijenfeldt 1995).
Brmgmg logether thèse three groups revealed both common
concerns as well as différences in perspective on thé perceived
idéal, context and practice of élection observation m Africa.
Two central issues m thèse discussions were- a) thé rôle, status
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and mandate of foreign élection observers in Africa and b) the
organization and exécution of élection observation. From thé
accounts of the actual field observers, whose expériences and
criticisms are not always reflected in thé final statements and
reports issued after an élection is concluded, it often appeared
that thèse two issues are never entirely resolved and necd con-
tinuous reassessmcnt (see Geisler 1993, Boneo 1996, Engel
1996 and Garothers 1997).
I. THE MANDATE AND ROLE OF ELECTION
OBSERVATION
In thé Introduction and in Ghapter 1, thé possibilities and con-
straints of élection observation - as a predominantly Western or
donor-country technique of democracy support — has been men-
tioned. A sustained commitment on thé part of the country
sending observers as well as of thé observers themselves to thé
idéal of democratie and fair élections as well as long-term
democratization of the country in question is a requirement
(cf. Goodwin-Gill 1994). A reflection on thé mandate and rôle
of élection observation relates to some of the ideological
justifications of observation and to thé personal motives of ob-
servers involved in it. Election observation for many observers
must be informed and guided by a commitment to and practical
implementation of ideals of equality, freedom of political ex-
pression, démocratie decision-making and équitable justice, of
which people in democratizing countries in Africa and else-
where were, and often still are, long deprived.
When discussing thé mandate and rôle of élection observa-
tion, at least three issues should be taken into account: l) the
formal and legal mission of the observers. What is their job,
what can be expected from them? Related to this the question
of the criteria of évaluation of the observers, 2) issues of legit-
imacy, for example, the local perception of the mandate and rôle
of observers, and 3) the relation between foreign and local
observers in the country.
1. On what basis are observers invited and sent to an élection?
The dominant idea behind sending élection observers from
countries where democratie structures are well-entrenched and
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non-controversial is that the présence and activities of ob-
servers can help to promote an atmosphère of 'freedom and
fairness' of the électoral process: free in allowing the unencum-
bered expression of political and party préférences of the élec-
torale and fair in allowing for reliable procedures of actual
voting and counting. Ideally this exercise is supposed to cover
the preparatory stage of the élection as well: registration of all
eligible voters, party formation and campaigning, acceptance of
candidates, média access and exposure, and the like. The activ-
ity of foreign observers could thus contribute to political stabil-
ity and orderly procedures, assuming that in the face of their
critical présence, illegal practices would be inhibited. In situ-
ations of civil unrest or the end of an long armed conflict, the
international community often tends to pressure for speedy
élections. Such a décision may be an act of self-delusion,
because no one's legitimacy, let alone democracy, will be estab-
lished by it.
This limited rôle and mandate is being differently inter-
preted by observers, the host government, the voting public and
the donor government providing them. Apart from the fact that
the status and position of observers differ according to country
of origin and membership in an overarching unit (from the EU
or thé UN, for instance), thé international observer is always in
a quandary: s/he has to respect thé local 'rules of the game',
made by others, which' may be at variance with those valid in
his/her own country and even be unfair from the start (for
example, party registration, campaigning opportunitics, voting
procédures which easily allow count-rigging afterwards). An
évaluation can and should be made by them on whether thé
'playing field is leveP: this requires more attention to context
and background than is possible or allowed on élection day (for
example, on thé 'différent weight' that certain votes hâve in
certain districts, on gerrymandering practices, on limited oppo-
sition party activity). Among many observers, thé idea has now
emerged that élection observation can only gain legitimacy -
and thus better fulfil its mandate - if thé period of observing is
extended before and after thé élections. (This idea has now
been put into practice in Kenya, in the December 1997 élec-
tions; see Rutten in this volume.)
It is not feasible for international observers to harshly criti-
cize thé problems of thé élection or government policy on thé
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basis of their own standards while on observation duty. What
falls defmitely within thé rôle of observers, however, is to give a
factual and business-like évaluation afterwards, in thé frame-
work of the observation unit in which they operate. In this
respect it often appears that many such Statements are written
in such a way as to see primarily positive aspects of the élec-
toral process, while thé mandate of observation is primarily to
give a critical assessment of it. This is in fact thé général advice
that thé observers received from thé governments that send
out to Africa: if in any way possible, thé process of democrat-
ization should be encouraged, and be seen in thé light of a
probably long process of 'building democracy'. In this context,
a mildly worded statement on thé élections, even if thèse did
not live up to expectations, should function as a political
signal. This practice (recently again demonstrated in thé
rather lame European Union observer report on thé Kenyan
élections of 1997) is conditioned by diplomatie convention, UN
middle-of-the-road policy, and by Realpolitik and rivalry
between thé larger donor-countries themselves, wishing to
keep or extend their local influence. But it ultimately subverts
thé mandate of observation, encourages complacency with thé
incumbent régime which 'got away with it', and leads to a
loss of confidence among thé wider public and civil society
organizations.
2. This brings us to thé second point: issues of legitimacy and
thé local perceptions of thé mandate and rôle of observers (by
both the government and the wider population), first it should
be remembered that around 1990, thé initial stimulus to
processes of political liberalization and democratization often
came from thé mass protests and rebellions of the African
populations (for example in Bénin, Togo, Nigeria, Malawi, Mali,
Kenya, Zambia, Zaire). This element tends to be forgotten in
many discussions, but points to thé fact that demands for de-
mocratization protests were formulated in thé idiom of social
reform, équitable justice, accountability, ending graft and cor-
ruption, and political rights for thé masses. Hence, this move-
ment has set part of the criteria which define thé legitimacy of
thé subséquent process of democratization, including thé insti-
tution of rule of law instead of (arbitrary) rule of persons and
thé électoral process.
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While it is true that thé international observers corne to a
sovereign country the laws and customs of which they should
respect, they hâve thé offical 'mission' to médiate and to be an
agent of communication in thé political process, however care-
fully they should fulfil this rôle. The local electorate often wel-
comes thé arrivai of international observers. The example of
Ghad was mentioned, where thé présence of the observers at
least initially signalled to many Ghadians that their country
was writing history and that they were becoming part of the
global movement of democratization.
The performance of observers is also judged from what they
say in their reports about the long-term prospects of democrat-
ization and thé nature of their attitude toward thé local gov-
ernment, especially if thé latter has doubtful legitimacy. It is
hère that local observers and thé electorate are often dis-
appointed (compare Buijtenhuijs 1996). The opinions of the
African voters on international observers, though not exten-
sively investigated, are mixed, but what is clear is that in many
cases they expected a lot from them, based on their own démoc-
ratie norms. While many voters may be illiterate and hâve little
formai éducation, they hâve their own norms and conceptions
of democracy and political decency (see thé Introduction,
above) which they expect to be honoured in élections an-
nounced as free and fair, and they also expect thèse to be
judged fairly by those international observers. The last point is
by no means a sure thing. From cases in Chad, Zanzibar, Togo,
Ethiopia or Kenya it is crystal clear that observers feil far short
of their expected rôle, and some were even insulted by voters
for not doing what they were supposed to do: expose fraud and
complain about dishonesty and manipulation. While not all
complaints are crédible — as losing opposition groups may try, in
their turn, to capture foreign opinion on thé élection process
for their own purposes - it is incumbent on thé observers not to
dismiss such domestic criticism out of hand.
The observer, however, cannot decisively interfère, only
observe and make statements on thé rather limited technical
procédures of voting. However, even in this last respect, ob-
servers frequently note that they are powerless to criticize
observed wrongs with thé authorities. When they do so emphat-
ically, they can end up having to wind up their activities and
leave the country.
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3. Glosely related to the foregoing is that of the relation between
foreign and local observers in the country. As part of the democrat-
ization programmes supported by donor-country embassies,
civic éducation projects and local NGOs are funded to enhance
local capacity and create local stakes in thé démocratie institu-
tion-building process. Thèse efforts are commendable. Up to
now, however, thé relation between thé international and thé
local observers is not well-investigated or even well-defined.
The impression among many Western observers is that the ex-
périences of domestic observation are not sufficiently taken into
account (cf. Nevitte & Canton 1997). Perhaps this is due to thé
perception among donor-embassies that domestic observers are
not independent enough (the same argument would apply, with
much more force, to the government in the country). But thé
fact is that in thé years of political liberalization since 1989, a
significant - though embattled - private or independent press
has been emerging in many African countries. Many of thèse
Journals, magazines and radio stations hâve gone through a
period of remarkable growth also in thé quality and range of
their reporting. Next to that, a whole new array of local NGOs,
often with development purposes, has emerged, no doubt many
jumping on the bandwagon of funding opportunities. A critical
assessment of the best of them would, however, yield a
significant pool of dependable local observers, in addition to
people from thé local churches which have oftcn been involved.
Hence in this domain, there is scope for much improvement,
and dependable observers in the country will be found by build-
ing long-term associations with thèse local NGOs and média,
provided their aims are within thé sphère of interest of donor-
country policy and are not political, sectarian, ethno-national-
ist, and the like. A moot point is whether party agents (for
instance, from thé opposition) could be used as observers — thé
local situation my often not allow it, and it may possibly be
putting them in a unpredictable or dangerous position after thé
élections.
There is, however, no doubt that a measured building
and use of local capacity of really independent observers
will enhance thé democratization process, especially when
models of coopération with thé international observers are
implemented.
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| II. THE ORGANIZATION AND EXECUTION OF
^ ELECTION OBSERVATION IN THE LIGHT OF
^.OBSERVERS' FIELD EXPERIENCES
V
„,* The Wider Context of Electoral Observation
£ The International Context
| Regarding thé assessment of existing practices of électoral ob-
|" servation and thé formulation of spécifie recommendations for
,*?- improvement, it might be useful to distinguish between local,
s, régional, national, bilateral-interstatal, and multilateral-
-^ interstatal objectives and constraints.
|"- A conspicuous set of constraints exists at the multilateral-
j" interstatal level. Hère the room for manoeuvre for any one
?" observer country in defining its relationship vis-à-vis the kost
i" country where élections are to be observed is largely determined
| by international relations such as exist between thé observer
"v country and other countries (for example, fellow member states
,> of thé European Union) with which thé observer countries en-
| tertain rather closer ties than with the host country itself. Thus
1 international observational practices which in terms of organ-
-* ization, recruitment, training, funding, have all the appearance
^ v of being predominantly bilatéral (they are conducted by or
| under thé aegis of a national Ministry of Foreign Affairs in close
\ association with the host country), in fact are expected to yield
; to international conventions, priorities, pressures, in a de facto
ï* multilatéral context.
|,
-A The Conditions for Electoral Observation
^ Should électoral observation exclusively be staged in response
| to a spécifie request from the field (that is, from the country
| where national élections are being held)?
| The alternative is that the initiative for électoral observation
is taken in thé North, in a situation of conditionality, where thé
l host country's (re-)admission to thé international Community
l of democratie states is at stake, or where spécifie donor support
| is made conditional to thé Implementation of spécifie democra-
? tic measures including fair and free élections.
< Obviously, such conditionality poses ethical, political and
*; international-légal problems. Is it not a manifest sign of
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hegemonie relations imposée! by thé North onto thé South? 1
Does it not infringe on national sovereignty? Is it not objectioü-
able for these very reasons? Or are we justified in claiming tKïï\|
democracy is sufficiently sacred a value so as to override consid*, *
erations of national sovereignty? ç,.'
Beyond such considérations in the field of international law, |l
it is only realistic to admit - from a political rather than legaî
perspective - that thé North is intervening in many aspects of ^
South societies and politics, and will continue to do so in the'*f
foreseeable future; from such a perspective thé question is not
so much whether thé North should engage in électoral observa- {
tion and in other forms of intervention, but on which grounds thé
North should be entitled to do so, and on the basis of which
principles and procédures.
The Wider Social Context
A wider field of questions opens up hère. A commonly accepted
point by now is that élections may be a necessary condition for
thé démocratie process, but they are far from a sufficient condi-
tion. The peaceful transition of power by means of élections -
such as électoral observation means to articulate - can only
succeed if ail relevant «r/ra-electoral conditions are fulfilled.
What are thèse conditions? They differ from country to country
and from historical moment to historical moment. Electoral ob-
servation (sometimes described as 'a bunch of UN officiais iso-
lated in some hôtel') may not offer the best possible perspective
on these extra-électoral conditions. Instead, thé extra-électoral
conditions might be better assessed by thé local embassies, if
they hâve good Unes of communication and information with
local organizations such as civic groups, independent press and
local NGOs, and national councils of churches.
However, it is important to preserve the independence and
neutrality of thé mandate of foreign électoral observers. This is
a major reason why, from thé Netherlands, électoral observa-
tion is organized from thc Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The
Haguc, rather than at a local level in the host country, and why
the local Netherlands Embassy is not too much involved. (An
important change has, however, subsequently becn introduced
during thé Kenyan élections of December 1997, where EU
diplomats stationed m Nairobi were actively involved m a new
model of observation.) In such a way it is ensured that thé elec-
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observation is perceived as truly multilateral, rather lhan
bilateral intervention between the Netherlands and the
|öst country. In practice, however, bilateral and multilateral
jlpects are intertwined, as we shall see below.
jiWith regard to the many variables that directly or indirectly
lear on électoral performance, countries have different profiles,
l bid it is here that specialized academie knowledge can come to
| jke assistance of policy-makers and électoral observers.
this point an element of cultural specificity needs to be ap-
||preciated for which perhaps a comparison with assessment
IJjbchmques in industry is illuminating. In industry, especially in
context of multinational corporations, the visiting inspec-
ä a usual form of intervention. It is remarkable that citi-— :j—uu, ;,m
of the various c,mujjta.n ^„~ ..
jiheir reaction to visiting inspection. From observers' reports
personal communications it appears that, for instance, the
JïBritish let themselves be guided by the conventional wisdom
under no circumstances should the inspecter be met with
i|nanifest signs of distrust. The French and the Swiss tend to
Jflnsist on a flexible response to visiting inspection. This field
feoffers opportunity to study the variety of ways in which codes of
ginternational hospitality are implemented locally. In général,
IJEuropeans tend to take offence at being inspected; Africans, on
other hand, tend to.respond more positively to this idea,
Evince for them the international inspection corroborâtes the
Ijl global importance of their national institutions.
K-Defimtions
IJi'Electoral observation is a complex field composed of inter-
|| related rôles. Therefore it is imperative that one maps out the
jij entire field within which such observation has to take place. We
fff! may distinguish between the following rôles:
H • the électoral supervisor: this is a member of the agency organiz-
j|| ing the élections, in the spécifie case that the élections are
H organized not by the national authorities but by an interna-
§*ï tional agency, or by the European Union or a United Nations
ijl division (for example, UNDP).
|f • the électoral observer: this is exclusively an observer, without
Ijl anything to do with the organization of the élections, and
k without any right to intervention.
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• the électoral monitor, this is a local person, usually from
field of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who
tions as an impartial local observer in thé case of
élections; thé électoral monitor has a limited right to
vention.
• the party agent: this is a local person who represents any
contesting parties within thé polling office.
We note that thé supervisor's rôle is to assist in thé organizà^H
tion of thé élections. By définition a supervisor cannot be an
server since thé rôles, while complementary, are fundamentallyljj
different. lij
Ideally, any électoral observer should display the followingjjl
characteristics. She or he should be a person il
• with some expérience concerning national élections; jj
• with a certain social status (hère a dilemma arises: although jl
thé idéal électoral observer should hâve a certain social:!
status, it stands to reason that this requirement is difficult j|
to meet in the case of long-term électoral observers: such jj
social status as they may hâve would usually mean that they |j
hâve pressing duties which preclude their availability for ]
long-term observer status); î
• with ample social abilities; |
• with thé ability to report both orally and in writing; j
• with thé ability to work in a team; 1
• with a fit physical condition;
• with adequate mastery of at least l) the international lan-
guage which is thé language of communication within thé ;
team; 2) thé international language which is the language
of communication between the team and the international
agency to which thé team belongs; and 3) thé international
language which is the language of communication between
thé team and thé local élection officers; in practice thèse
three languages may be one and thé same, but this is not
always thé case;
• with adéquate inter-cultural expérience.
The électoral observation mission starts with thé recruitment
of électoral observers. Ideally such recruitment should proceed
along uniform criteria implemented throughout the European
Union. In practice, however, no such uniformity is achieved. As
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there tend to be gréât différences in social, educational,
jllïonomic and professional status among électoral observers re-
Ijlruited for thé same mission, which results in considérable
jjpoblems of communication and leadership within thé observa-
team.
K Several speakers during the session insisted that at présent
sélection criteria of électoral observers are far from trans-
|||iirent, and often rather arbitrary (for example, thé fact that
has once worked for thé former Dutch Directorate General
International Coopération, under thé Netherlands Ministry
Foreign Affairs section for development coopération).
•Certain social positions would seem to be particularly suitable
recruit électoral observers from, for example members of
IpLational parliaments, members of the European parliament,
fendjournalists.
Il Short-term électoral observation is as a rule not remuner-
nor supported by any spécifie training, There is a général
|pj|eeling that this state of affairs is undesirable since it may be
Sconducive to amateurism on thé part of the short-term ob-
|j|servers. Since long-term observers tend to be both remunerated
specifically trained, thé current situation also tends to lead
unnecessary estrangement between long-term and short-
JJIterm électoral observers.
IH Ideally, the training of électoral observers should at least
•T highlight the following topics:
IJL • thé terms of référence under which thé spécifie électoral ob-
IJI servation in question takes place;
Br • the distinction between thé various rôles in the field of elec-
II toral observation (observer, monitor, supervisor, party
Ijl agent);
B • the authority of the électoral observer;
||i • the scope of the mandate under which électoral observation
fr takes place;
• * the relationship between électoral observers and the local
|H élection officers;
1| • the relationship between électoral observers and local
B monitors;
lp • the différence between observation and supervision;
t • the relation with the local population;
jf • the techniques and limitations of eye-witnessing.
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On thé last point, it is important that thé électoral observers
realize the weaknesses of eye-witnessing as an assessment tech-
nique. It is useful to distinguish between types of observation
according to thé three phases of the électoral process:
• thé observation of procédural mechanisms in thé polling
office;
• thé observation of the processing of the électoral results
after the completed voting materials have left the polling
office;
• thé observation of thé électoral results as reported after thé
processing of all the votes.
Often thé rôle of the électoral observer is conceived as being
restricted to thé first phase, that of the polling office. This is
naive, also in view of the defccts of eye-witness observation, as
amply demonstrated by observational psychology.
As far as the relation with the local population is concerned,
it is important that the électoral observers have ample previous
inter-cultural expérience, as well as an intensive introduction to
the local culture, religions, and social conventions. They should
be prepared for a situation where the local perception of élec-
toral observers may show considérable discrepancy with the ob-
servers' self-perception as unremunerated, self-sacrificing
représentatives of lofty democratie ideals. In some cases (as ob-
servers from Zanzibar (1995) and Chad (1996) reported), élec-
toral observers were met with signs of hatred from the local
population, as if thé électoral observers were locally considered
to be in league with the national political élite, perceived as
corrupt and inimical to populär interests.
Just as we found on thé point of sélection criteria, there turn
out to be marked différences in local préparation and training
between électoral observers from thé various European coun-
tries. In recent times we have seen the émergence of formai
training institutions for électoral observation, often in a certain
compétitive relationship. Such institutions include:
• thé International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA), a Stockholm-based organization which
over the years has built up considérable expérience in thé
field of électoral observation;
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thé Association of West European Parliamentarians for
Africa (AWEPA), involved in thé organization, sponsoring
and management of élection observation;
thé European Centre for Development Policy Management
(or ECDPM, in Maastricht, thé Netherlands), which in
1996 initiated a pilot project with EU funding in which
15 member states participate;
thé Netherlands also, the foundation Kontakt dermlii til^ l l v,m--.i **~*~«~ ,
Kontinenten (based in Zeist) is active in the field.
Issues such as training and rémunération raise questions as to
the desired level of professionalization of électoral observers.
We shall come back to this point in the conclusion.
Debriefing
What is done with the électoral observers' expériences after
their return from the host country? Debriefing offers the oppor-
tunity of sharing their anxiety and frustration and indignation,
if any. The problem, however, is that such debriefing tends to
take place at the local level (within the national framework, for
example of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs),
whereas the organization of électoral observation, and such
frustrations as thé observers may have experienced, normally
take place at thé international level: that of the European
Union, or thé United Nations. Even so, there seems to be con-
sidérable leeway even at the national level. Some of the prob-
lems that électoral observers have experienced during their
mission may therefore be attended to at this national level. For
example, in Sweden the décision to professionalize électoral ob-
servation was taken at the national level, and within a very
short time.
The composition of the spécifie team of électoral observers is
considered to be of gréât importance. The électoral observation
team should be composed of members who in genera! meet the
ideal characteristics of électoral observers as defined above.
The team should have an équitable composition in terms of
gender and age. In addition, each team should comprise at least
one member who speaks thé local language(s), so that the team
is at liberty to communicate with the électoral monitors
without involving any third party. The idéal team is composed
'fj
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in such a way that there are no very gréât différences in social,
economie, educational and professional status between thé,
members, so that there will be no insurmountable problems of f
communication and leadership.
The duration of électoral observation is determined by the ',
agency which organizes thé électoral observation, and usually
this is not the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but an >
international organization like thé European Union or thé
United Nations.
For short-term électoral observation a period of three weeks
has become established. The reasons for this are largely practi-
cal: the électoral observers' professional and personal life suffers
minimal disturbance in such a short term; médical examina-
tions can be made prior to departure; and so on. However, it has
been suggested that if thé organizing agency would rely on an
established pool of experienced électoral observers, these practi-
cal problems would be reduced to a minimum and different time
frames could begin to be contemplated.
Given thé intricacies of political cultures, political historiés
and political structures at thé national level, and given thé
practical problems of communication and logistics (among
them, scarcity of transport, relatively paucity of électoral ob-
servers as cornpared to thé number of polling stations, cultural
and linguistic problems of communication), électoral observa-
tion which extends over only a few days around thé actual
moment of thé élections is fraught with difficulties. It may at
times hâve only a symbolic and political function instead of a
strictly observational and non-biased one. In order to counter
this effect, any short-term électoral observation needs to be in-
formed and facilitated by long-term observation in the hands of
more specialized observers (including académies) equipped
with extensive local knowledge (for more on this, see Mair
1997). The transfer of knowledge between long-term observers
and short-term observers deserves spécial attention. Even so, it
is important that a certain préparation précèdes thé actual
électoral observation, not only in the country of origin, but also
within the host country. Electoral observers should ideally be in
the host country a considérable amount of time before the
actual élections.
Too often thé mandate and thé code of conduct remain
merely implicit. Electoral observation involves complex actions
SB"
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in politically and socially sensitive, complex situations. It is im-
portant that thé rules governing such actions are made explicit
in thé first place. However, usually this is not the case. Often
thé électoral observers' mandate is scarcely if at all defined.
This créâtes immense problems: how, by what concrète procé-
dures, and against what criteria should one assess électoral per-
formance? There are likely to be cultural différences in thé
interprétation of thé mandate, both between thé various
European nations which compose thé team of électoral observa-
tion, and between thé électoral observers and the host country.
And beyond such cultural différences, there are thé bilatéral
political and economie self-interests of the Northern countries
participating in thé électoral observation, which may be con-
ducive to an oblique interprétation of thé mandate. It is a first
priority that thé mandate and thé code of conduct attending
électoral observation be made explicit and be agreed upon by
ail parties concerned.
From Electoral Observation tojudicial Intervention in the Field?
It was suggested during thé session that thé members of an
électoral observation team would be in an excellent position to
dispense 'instant justice': not only to witness infringement of
thé électoral laws and procedures of the host country, but also
to redress any such infringements on thé spot, thus reinforcing
thé voters' confidence in thé élections as a form of political self-
expression. However, it is a principle of électoral observation
(and an implicit condition of the host country's agreement to
admit électoral observation) that it remains just that, without
developing into intervention on thé spot. Therefore, such
judicial intervention is simply impossible and would be counter-
productive.
The Officiai Statement at the End of Electoral Observation
The final product of an électoral observation mission is the
assessment statement, passing a solemn, international verdict on
thé quality of spécifie élections. It is indicative of the problems
in this field - problems both of an organizational and political
nature - that in most cases of électoral observation no explicit
procedure has been evolved for thé formulation of such an as-
sessment statement. Minority opinions within thé team of ob-
servers are difficult to accommodate. There is gréât pressure
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towards unanimity, and there may also be pressure, to a lesser
extent, towards a positive assessment. Ail this means that there
is no water-tight guarantee that thé official assessment state-
ment as produced and publicized is in actual fact supported by
ail observers, despite its suggestion of unanimity.
A major point of concern on thé part of individual électoral
observers is therefore thé way in which their individual report is
incorporated in thé officiai overall assessment statement as
issued by thé international organization of which thé individual
électoral observer is a member. There is much appréhension
that especially critical, potentially explosive individual reports
are likely to be swept under the carpet. The dilemma hère is:
either to articulate one's own individual views, or to allow thèse
views to be submerged in thé wider international framework of
thé agency organizing thé électoral observation. Hère there are
considérable pitfalls. Electoral observers from one country may,
for example, corne to thé conclusion that they are being hi-
jacked by thé bilatéral intercsts of another country (for
example, some European countries by France in francophone
Africa). Only thé articulation of explicit, clear and universal
rules can prevent such a situation.
THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL AND THE ELECTORAL
OBSERVER'S FREEDOM OF OPERATION
The Multilatéral Context of Electoral Observation
Electoral observation today usually takes place in a context
where various fellow member states of international bodies or
thé EU and UN are involved. Also, more than one international
body may be involved at the same time. This situation calls for
rather greater and consistent coordination than is now common
practice in the field of électoral observation. We have already
noted thé defects of thé présent situation, making for gréât dis-
crepancies in such fields as thé sélection and training of élec-
toral observers.
Who organizes thé élections? This is of course neither a
forcign donor-country embassy nor a foreign Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Electoral observation may, however, be organ-
ized to a large extent by foreign parties like thé Europoan
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Union, thé United Nations, or the OSCE (Organization for
Security and Coopération in Europe), as in Bosnia, or in
Namibia and Angola.
But multilatéral frameworks often create opaque complex-
ities and entanglements, and it may not be advisable to hâve a
situation where thé same agency organizes both thé élections and
thé électoral observation. Bosnia 1996 is a case in point: both
were organized there by thé OSCE. Such a situation clearly
poses very spécifie problems from thé point of view of électoral
observation and its independence.
In général, thé crucial question in this connection is: how
does one guarantee a maximum of independence to thé électoral
observer? Hère again thé formai framing of électoral observa-
tion in accepted policy and written procedures does not offer
the électoral observer much guidance. How is the concept of in-
dependent opération formally defined by thé policy-makers as
part of thé mandate and thé code of conduct? Are there discrep-
ancies between thé various Northern countries, and between
them and the host country, in this respect? This remains a point
for further analysis.
In addition to such formal procedures, logistic aspects of élec-
toral observation (such as thé observers' transport, lodging,
food) constitute major boundary conditions on which thé inde-
pendence and representativeness of électoral observation
dépends. Observers who are confined to one place for lack of
adéquate transport, who are poorly lodged or poorly fed, cannot
function optimally, and hâve difficulty preserving their indepen-
dence from political actors on thé local scène who may provide
thé transport, shelter and food they are themselves lacking.
Hère shocking discrepancies can be observed. Electoral ob-
servers working in Africa and Europe may be discouraged by
thé extrême différences (on such points as logistic facilities,
military protection, financial resources) between récent situ-
ations of électoral observation in thèse two continents. For
example, against 400 troops protecting électoral observers in
Angola in 1992, as many as 30,000 troops were available for
such an assignment in Bosnia in 1996!
Such discrepancies hâve an alarming effect on thé individual
électoral observers and make them wonder whether, after ail,
they are not merely being used for wmdow-dressing, in order to
rubber stamp a political performance in thé South which, while
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falling short of formai requirements, yet serves thé interests of "|
states of the North. '̂
CONCLUSION
When considering thé rôle and mandate of électoral observation
in Africa, it can be said that a clearer définition would be
necessary beforehand, both for thé observers and for thé in-
ternational organizations involved. The legitimacy and thé in-
tegrity of thé observers in thé local setting, especially vis-à-vis
thé emerging local civil society and thé wider electorate,
should be of prime concern, and not the maintenance at all
costs of diplomatie niceties with the host country. Criticism (if
necessary) of the actual running of the preparatory stages and
thé actual voting, of thé political contest, of campaigning, of
institutional hindrances to political freedom and lack of équi-
table judicial proceedmgs, should be communicated in thé
final reports, next to concrète suggestions to thé local govern-
ment for improvements. A suggested trajectory for future
democratization - based on good knowledge of the country, its
history and its political System - should be laid out. A point
often made is that no rhetorical compromise at the expense
of substance should be made, because in the end inter-
national élections observation will thereby undermine itself
and become irrelevant in the eyes of all parties concerned
(cf. Cooper & Stroux 1996).
Concerning thé actual organisation of élection observation, thé
idea of professionalization of électoral observation often cornes up
(for a proposai to this end, see Tostensen et al. 1997). But is it
at ail acceptable? If so, what should be professionalized in thé
field of électoral observation? Perhaps this should be not so
much the rôle of the électoral observer as such (for élections,
however important, are relalively rare events, and thé require-
ments of neutrality and social engagement on thé part of the
électoral observers would rather point to non-professionals who
discharge this specialist rôle only occasionally). Of course, thé
sélection of observer candidates in thé donor-countries could be
substantially improved, notably m choosing people who are
familiär with other cultures, hâve a sensitivity to and basic
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knowledge of history and social context, and do not only focus
on elite politics (these minimal criteria have by no means been
applied in the past). In addition, one should work towards a pro-
fessionalization of the organisation of électoral observation procédure
itself (compare Rutten's chapter in this volume). This would
hâve to include agreements on thé division of labour, logistical
opération, work methods, standards of integrity and honest re-
porting, and résistance to diplomatie pressure to manipulate
final Statements.
There is one thing certainly to be said against total profession-
alization: it reveals scepticism or even, in sorne cases, despair
with regard to thé future of democracy in the host countries. For
surely, one would hope that électoral observation is, if not a once-
and-for-all thing, at least an exercise with a limited time span,
i.e., the observers should never have to come back if the democ-
ratie structures are being put in place in the country. Assistance
by donor-countries with this process can also take other forms.
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